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De-Clawing Katz: Emerging Technology
and the Exclusionary Rule
Samuel C. Cole*
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Stephens, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals con-
sidered whether the exclusionary rule applied to evidence obtained from an
illegal search in which police officers attached a Global Positioning System
(GPS) device to a suspect's car.1 Police arrested Henry Stephens on May 16,
2011, and a grand jury later indicted him on a federal count of possessing
firearms as a convicted felon.2 Stephens filed a motion to suppress, alleging
that the evidence against him was obtained through an illegal search.3 After
the district court denied Stephens's motion to suppress, Stephens pleaded
guilty to the charges conditionally, pending the result of his appeal of the
denial of his motion to suppress.4 The exclusionary rule allows evidence ob-
tained through certain illegal searches to be excluded.5 The rule does not
extend, however, to illegal searches "conducted in objectively reasonable re-
liance on binding appellate precedent."6 The search in Stephens took place
before the Supreme Court stated unambiguously that attaching a GPS to a
vehicle constitutes a "search" under the Fourth Amendment.7 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court held in 1983 that using a "beeper," the technological pre-
cursor to a GPS, in a police operation did not constitute an illegal "search"
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.8 Thus, the Fourth Circuit ruled that
the exclusionary rule did not apply because the police officers reasonably
relied on binding precedent.9 While the holding in Stephens seems narrow at
first glance, its impact is widespread and will negatively impact civil liber-
ties. Stephens allows police officers or other federal agents to interpret bind-
* Samuel C. Cole is a candidate for a Juris Doctor at SMU Dedman School of
Law. He would like to thank his amazing wife, Ashley, for inspiring him and
making it possible for him to work hard every day. He would also like to thank
his two children, Paul and Audrey, for not distracting him quite as much as
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I. See United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 2014).
2. See id. at 330.
3. See id.
4. See id. at 330-31.
5. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423-24 (2011).
6. Id. at 2423-24.
7. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
8. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
9. See United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 2014).
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ing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence too broadly-even when it relates to
the ever-changing world of technology.10
II. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND: STEPHENS INVOKES
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Stephens worked as a security guard at "Club Unite," a nightclub in
Baltimore, Maryland.II Police heard from a registered confidential informant
that Stephens was involved in drug trafficking, and that he regularly took a
gun to work despite being a convicted felon.12 Without obtaining a warrant,
police installed a GPS device on the exterior of Stephens's car over two
periods "from March 20 to April 12, 2011, and again from May 13 to May
16, 201 1."13 On May 16, 2011, having finally obtained "reasonable suspi-
cion, if not probable cause" that Stephens possessed a weapon, Officer Paul
Geare and another police officer followed Stephens to work.14 The officers
then trailed him by monitoring the GPS.15 When Stephens arrived at work,
police searched him and found an empty holster around his waist and a
loaded pistol in his car. 16 A grand jury promptly indicted Stephens for illegal
possession of a firearm.17
After Stephens's arrest, but before his conviction, the U.S. Supreme
Court decided United States v. Jones.18 In Jones, the Supreme Court held that
the warrantless installation and use of a GPS on a suspect's vehicle consti-
tutes a Fourth Amendment violation.19 Citing to Jones and relying on the
exclusionary rule, Stephens moved to suppress the government's evidence
against him because it was obtained through illegally attaching a GPS to his
car.20 In ruling on Stephens's motion, the district court agreed with Stephens
that, under Jones, the officers' installation and use of a GPS on Stephens's
car for almost two months was indeed an illegal search.21 Nevertheless, the
court held that the officers acted in objectively reasonable good faith when
10. The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. CONsTr. amend. IV.
I1. See Stephens, 764 F.3d at 329.
12. See id. at 329-30.
13. Id. at 339 (Thacker, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 330.
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See Stephens, 764 F.3d at 330.
18. See id.
19. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
20. See Stephens, 764 F.3d at 330.
21. See id.
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they conducted the search.22 Because the officers acted in good faith, the
court ultimately held that the exclusionary rule did not apply.23 With no other
legal options left and no hope of succeeding at trial, Stephens pleaded guilty
conditionally, pending the Fourth Circuit's review of the denial of his motion
to suppress. 24
IH. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION: THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
DOES NOT APPLY
The Fourth Circuit assumed, without actually holding, that the search
was illegal after Jones.25 Nevertheless, the court held that, because the of-
ficers had acted in "objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate pre-
cedent," the exclusionary rule did not apply.26 This "reasonable reliance" test
derives from Davis v. United States.27 The Supreme Court in Davis held that,
when police officers within the jurisdiction of the Eleventh Circuit were act-
ing in accordance with Eleventh Circuit precedent as it existed at the time of
the search, the exclusionary rule did not apply.28 The court reached this hold-
ing despite the fact that the Supreme Court previously (after the search but
before the appeal) reversed the Eleventh Circuit precedent that the officers
had relied on. 29 In fact, the Davis petitioner had even conceded that the
search was in accordance with then-current precedent.30 The Davis Court ex-
plained that the exclusionary rule is a "judicially created remedy," not one
mandated by the Constitution.31 Thus, the sole purpose of the exclusionary
rule is to encourage compliance with the Fourth Amendment.32
Following the Davis Court, the Stephens court had to consider whether
sufficiently specific, binding precedent existed at the time of the search upon
which the officers could have reasonably relied when they attached the GPS
device to Stephens's car. 33 In order to answer this question, the Stephens
court surveyed the relevant mandatory and persuasive precedent as it had
existed at the time of the search. First, however, the Fourth Circuit articulated
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 330-31.
25. See id. at 334.
26. Stephens, 764 F.3d at 329 (quoting Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419,
2423-24 (2011)).
27. Id. (citing Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2423-24).
28. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2434.
29. See id. at 2428.
30. See id.
31. Id. at 2427 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
32. See id. at 2426.
33. Id. at 2434.
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the overarching definition of a "search" as provided by the Supreme Court in
Katz v. United States.34 In Katz, the Supreme Court held that state action
constitutes an illegal "search" under the Fourth Amendment if it violates "an
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable."35 Af-
ter defining "search" in general terms, the Stephens court turned to its own
binding precedent as it existed at the time of the search, as well as some
persuasive authority that previously interpreted whether installing a GPS de-
vice on a car met the "reasonably expectation of privacy" definition of
"search" provided by Katz.
First, the Fourth Circuit looked at its own precedent related to the exte-
rior of vehicles.36 In United States v. George, for instance, the court stated in
dicta that "there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle's
exterior," although it is clear from context that the court was only referring to
the visible exterior of a vehicle.37 Nevertheless, the court concluded that,
under 2011 jurisprudence, vehicles generally warranted diminished Fourth
Amendment protection.38
Second, while acknowledging that neither the Supreme Court nor the
Fourth Circuit had ever ruled on whether attaching a GPS device to a vehicle
was a Fourth Amendment search, the court considered persuasive analogous
jurisprudence relating to "beepers."39 As the Supreme Court described in
United States v. Knotts, "[a] beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery
operated, which emits periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio re-
ceiver."40 In Stephens, the Fourth Circuit relied extensively on Knotts.41 In
34. See United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 2014).
35. The complex way in which courts have applied Katz is beyond the scope of this
note. The application of the Katz test might shift, though, for reasons com-
pletely unrelated to emerging technology. For instance, although it was a "close
question," the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that a homeless man had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a duffel bag and cardboard
box he left at his "home" under a bridge. State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 154
(Conn. 1991). The court noted, however, that "leaving one's property in an area
'readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members
of the public' may render one's expectation of privacy less than reasonable."
Id. at 153 (quoting California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988)). In other
words, context matters in cases applying the Katz test. Evolving technology, as
a particularly mutable context, is especially likely to cause a shift in "reasona-
ble expectations."
36. See Stephens, 764 F.3d at 331.
37. Id. (quoting United States v. George, 971 F.2d 1113, 1119 (4th Cir. 1992), as
amended (Aug. 12, 1992).
38. See id.
39. See id. at 332.
40. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
41. See, e.g., Stephens, 764 F.3d at 332-33.
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Knotts, police officers hid a beeper in a bottle of chloroform, suspecting that
the purchasers of these chloroform bottles would use the substance to make
illegal drugs.42 One of the defendants purchased the chloroform and loaded
the bottle into a car. 4 3 The two defendants proceeded to drive to Leroy
Knotts's secluded cabin that was used to manufacture controlled sub-
stances.44 The police followed, relying on the beeper.45 Knotts claimed that
following him using the beeper was an illegal search under the Fourth
Amendment.46 The Knotts Court disagreed, observing that following Knotts
using a beeper was not much different than following Knotts otherwise, as
beepers only work at close range.47 Furthermore, Knotts had no "reasonable
expectation of privacy" on a public road.48 He made it known to the world
where he was going.49
After examining Knotts, the Stephens court examined how the circuit
courts reacted to Knotts prior to 201 1.50 Many circuit courts, including the
Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, concluded that Knotts applied di-
rectly to GPS cases. 51 Only one circuit court that considered the issue, the
D.C. Circuit, did not think that Knotts applied automatically to GPS cases. 52
Based on these sister circuit interpretations of Knotts, the Fourth Circuit itself
theorized, in dicta, that Knotts stands for the proposition that "monitoring of
a beeper falls within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment when it reveals a
critical fact about the interior of premises that could not have been obtained
through visual surveillance."53 Notably, however, only five circuits-the
Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and the D.C. Circuit-had ever considered
whether Knotts applied to GPS tracking cases.54
After examining all of the relevant federal precedent (some binding,
some persuasive), the Fourth Circuit then turned to persuasive state court
precedent.55 The Maryland state courts spoke much more directly to the issue
42. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 278-279.
45. See id. at 278.
46. See id. at 279.
47. See id. at 281.
48. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82.
49. See id.
50. See United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 2014).
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 31 F.3d 1304, 1310 (4th Cir. 1994)).
54. See id.
55. See id. at 334. There was some question in Stephens whether Officer Geare
was, in fact, bound by state court precedent for purposes of the exclusionary
2015] 51
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of whether attaching a GPS to a vehicle constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment.56 For instance, in Stone v. State, the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals stated explicitly (albeit in dicta) that "the use of [a] GPS device
could not be a Fourth Amendment violation."57 To reach this conclusion, the
Maryland court relied extensively on the Supreme Court's opinion in
Knotts.58 Notably, the Maryland court found it significant that GPS technol-
ogy was "simply the next generation" of tracking technology after the beeper
at issue in Knotts.59 Surely, then, the court reasoned, Knotts should apply to
GPS technology.60 The Maryland Court of Appeals later confirmed this dic-
tum to have been state law prior to 2011: "before Jones, binding appellate
precedent in Maryland, namely Knotts, authorized the GPS tracking of a ve-
hicle on public roads."61 Thus, although Maryland case law is only persua-
sive authority for the federal system, it was clear that before Jones, four
federal circuits and the Maryland state courts believed that Knotts did indeed
apply to GPS tracking cases.
Based on the foregoing precedent, the Fourth Circuit held that the police
officers in Stephens could have reasonably relied on Knotts when they at-
tached the GPS device to Stephens's car.62 Thus, the district court was cor-
rect in holding that the exclusionary rule did not apply. Even assuming,
arguendo, that the Davis Court required reliance on binding precedent (as it
said that it did), the Fourth Circuit concluded that Knotts was sufficiently on
point: "it is the legal principle of Knotts, rather than the precise factual cir-
cumstances, that matters."63 The manner in which other federal circuit courts
and the Maryland state courts interpreted Knotts before Jones significantly
bolsters this argument, the court reasoned.64
rule. Id. at 338. Geare was a federal agent, but he was also a Baltimore City
police officer. See id. Furthermore, the investigation into Stephens was a joint,
federal-and-state operation. See id. The court, however, essentially assumed,
arguendo, that Officer Geare was not bound by state court precedent. See id.
Regardless, this issue is beyond the scope of this note because the note objects
more to the court's overbroad reasoning than to its specific holding. Moreover,
it is worth noting that the dissent disagreed with the majority despite the fact
that Maryland precedent was unambiguous. See id. at 342-43 (Thacker, J.,
dissenting).
56. See id.
57. Id. (quoting Stone v. State, 941 A.2d 1238, 1250 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008)).
58. See Stephens, 764 F.3d at 334.
59. Id. (quoting Stone, 941 A.2d at 1250).
60. See id.
61. Id. (quoting Kelly v. State, 82 A.3d 205, 216 (Md. 2013)).
62. See id. at 338.
63. Id.
64. See Stephens, 764 F.3d at 338.
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IV. CRITIQUE OF THE DECISION: A NARROw HOLDING OR AN
AFFRONT TO CIVIL LIBERTIES?
Although the holding seems narrow, Stephens sets dangerous precedent.
Contrary to Stephens, courts should encourage police officers to construe
cases involving emerging technology narrowly when the holding limits the
scope of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court implied as much. In
Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court held that using a thermovision
imaging device to look at heat patterns inside a suspect's house was an un-
lawful search under the Fourth Amendment.65 In Kyllo, a federal officer sus-
pected that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana in his home.66 To discover
whether Kyllo was in fact growing marijuana, the officer used an Agema
Thermovision 210 thermal imager to scan Kyllo's home.67 The scan revealed
that parts of the house were unusually hot from heat lamps used to grow
marijuana.68 After obtaining a warrant, federal officers searched Kyllo's
home and found that he was, indeed, growing marijuana.69 Kyllo entered a
conditional guilty plea pending the appeal of his unsuccessful motion to
suppress.70
In addition to discussing the enhanced expectation of privacy inside
one's home, the Kyllo Court discussed the intersection of emerging technol-
ogy and the Fourth Amendment.7' "It would be foolish," noted the Court, "to
contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amend-
ment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology."72 Surveil-
lance technology is growing more invasive of spheres formerly regarded as
private.73 The Court was concerned lest the ever-increasing invasiveness of
technology continue to "erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amend-
ment."74 The Court rejected the Government's argument that using
Thermovision was not a search because it did not provide the officers with
65. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
66. See id. at 29.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 30.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 34; see also Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technolo-
gies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MIcH. L. REv. 801,
866 (2004) (discussing the possibility of increased wiretaps due to the in-
temet's rising trend of encryption).
74. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
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substantial information.75 Instead, the Court re-affirmed a flexible under-
standing of the Katz test using the following language:
Reversing [this flexible understanding] . . . would leave the home-
owner at the mercy of advancing technology-including imaging
technology that could discern all human activity in the home.
While the technology used in the present case was relatively
crude, the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated
systems that are already in use or in development.76
Thus, courts-and, by extension, police officers-should interpret Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence related to emerging technology broadly when the
courts expand Fourth Amendment protections.77 A logical corollary to this
rule is that courts and police officers should interpret Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence related to emerging technology narrowly when the courts limit
Fourth Amendment protections.
Legal scholars have cautioned that courts should tread carefully when
addressing Fourth Amendment protections as they apply to emerging tech-
nologies.78 For instance, Professor Marc McAllister argues that courts should
not rely on analogies to old technology when dealing with related new tech-
nology.79 The problem, according to McAllister, is that "these supposed anal-
ogies are so far removed from the new forms of surveillance that analogies to
them only confuse, rather than clarify, the actual analysis required by
Katz."o To prove this point, McAllister looks at the very line of cases at
issue in Stephens.81 Despite the fact that four circuit courts interpreted Knotts
to apply to GPS devices,82 five concurring Justices in Jones recognized that
"an officer trailing a car turn-by-turn is far less invasive than the long-term
monitoring of a vehicle by GPS" and that "the situations entail very different
75. See id. at 35.
76. Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 36-37.
78. See Kerr, supra note 73, at 804 ("The view that the Fourth Amendment should
be interpreted broadly in response to technological change has been embraced
by . . . nearly everyone . . . who has written on the intersection of technology
and criminal procedure.").
79. See Marc McAllister, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: The Mis-
application of Analogical Reasoning, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 475, 477-78 (2012).
80. Id. at 477.
81. See id. at 478.
82. See United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 2014).
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expectations of privacy."83 At least four of the five Justices in Jones who
reached this conclusion did not find it necessary to overrule Knotts.84
McAllister also draws support for his thesis from the line of cases
originating in Smith v. Maryland.85 In Smith, the Supreme Court held that
because most people understand that phone companies keep records of the
numbers they dial, it was not a Fourth Amendment search for police to get
this information from the phone company.86 In United States v. Forrester, the
Ninth Circuit extended Smith's reasoning to apply to "computer surveillance
techniques that reveal the to/from addresses of e-mail messages, the LIP ad-
dresses of websites visited and the total amount of data transmitted to or from
an account."87 Even though the analogy between the technologies at issue in
Smith and Forrester is plausible, McAllister argues that this sort of broad,
analogical reasoning results in a simplistic application of the Katz test.88 The
Internet did not exist when Smith was decided.89 It is very possible, then, that
reasonable expectations of privacy with respect to the Internet are different
from the reasonable expectations of privacy a person expected in the 1970's
with telephones.90 After all, the Supreme Court in Smith stressed, "in apply-
ing the Katz analysis to this case, it is important to begin by specifying pre-
cisely the nature of the state activity that is challenged."91 The holding in
Stephens encourages police officers to engage in faulty analogical reasoning
that McAllister and other scholars92 condemn. If anything, McAllister's cau-
tion applies with extra force to the Davis rule because police officers are less
equipped than courts to properly analyze precedents.
83. McAllister, supra note 79, at 478-79.
84. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring);
see also Stephens, 764 F.3d at 342 n.4 (Thacker, J., dissenting) (A beeper and a
GPS device "are of an entirely different character. A beeper tracking device
requires law enforcement to at least be in proximity to the device to receive the
transmitted signal, whereas a GPS device downloads location data at specific
time intervals with no proximity needed. . . . In other words, with the use of a
GPS device, law enforcement may simply download the data from afar at their
leisure, as they did in this case.").
85. See McAllister, supra note 79, at 479-80.
86. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979).
87. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008).
88. See McAllister, supra note 79, at 480.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 (emphasis added).
92. See, e.g., Frank Lin, Siri, Can You Keep A Secret? A Balanced Approach to
Fourth Amendment Principles and Location Data, 92 OR. L. REv. 193, 221
(2013) ("[A]s technology changes, the expectations of the hypothetical reason-
able person change as well.").
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The Stephens holding is especially inappropriate if the nexus between
emerging technology jurisprudence and the Fourth Amendment is constantly
in flux. As the dissent in Stephens pointed out, "Davis did not ... answer 'the
. . . question whether the exclusionary rule applies when the law governing
the constitutionality of a particular search is unsettled."93 In fact, a quick
review of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence reveals that it is changing rap-
idly with respect to emerging technologies. Aside from Jones, Riley v. Cali-
fornia also illustrates this trend. In Riley, the Supreme Court held that police
officers could not search data on cell phones without first obtaining a war-
rant, even if the search was incidental to a lawful arrest.94 The Riley Court
explained in detail the differences between modern-day cell phones and prior
technologies that existed even ten years ago. 95 The Court then decisively re-
jected the Government's argument that searching a cell phone is "materially
indistinguishable" from searching other personal items found in the pocket of
an arrestee, such as a billfold, wallet, or address book.96 Nevertheless, the
Court implied that many of these types of items could be considered techno-
logical precursors to cell phones.97 The Government's argument, though, "is
like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to
the moon. Both are ways of getting from point A to point B, but little else
justifies lumping them together."98
It is true that Stephens and Riley involved different contexts. In Riley,
police were searching new technology,99 and, in Stephens, police were using
new technology to conduct a search.100 Riley implicates the Fourth Amend-
ment directly,oI whereas Stephens deals with the applicability of the exclu-
sionary rule.1 02 Nevertheless, the same type of reasoning should apply to both
cases. Recognizing the fact-specific nature of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence, Riley warns against simplistic analogies between less-advanced and
93. United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 346 (4th Cir. 2014) (Thacker, J., dis-
senting) (quoting Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2435 (2011)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
94. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014).
95. See id. at 2484, 2489-90.
96. Id. at 2488-89.
97. See id. at 2489 (Modem cell phones "are in fact minicomputers that also hap-
pen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone. They could just as easily be
called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries,
diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.").
98. Id.
99. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480.
100. United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 2014).
101. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494-95.
102. Stephens, 764 F.3d at 329.
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more-advanced technologies.103 Especially in cases involving emerging tech-
nologies, caution is the best policy-for courts or police officers-when in-
terpreting precedent. Even when a court has ruled decisively that using a
certain technology is not an unlawful search, the jurisprudence with respect
to more advanced technology is still very much in flux. The Stephens court
should have interpreted Davis in a way that, like Riley, more adequately
respected this fact.
V. CONCLUSION: A BRAVE NEW WORLD OF ADVANCED
SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY AND LIMITED FOURTH
AMENDMENT PROTECTION?
Finally, the holding of the Stephens court is likely to curtail Fourth
Amendment freedoms severely in the future. For example, the Supreme
Court has held that "a temporary detention for questioning in the case of an
airport search" is generally "permissible" under the Fourth Amendment.104
Researchers at the Mayo Clinic are currently developing "thermal imaging
technology that measures 'heat patterns created by [facial expressions]' that
'change dramatically [when a person lies].' "105 Unlike conventional lie de-
tector tests, however, this technology could easily be adapted for efficient use
at airport checkpoints.106 This new lie-detecting technology is arguably anal-
ogous to the airport questioning currently permitted by the Supreme Court.
Under the rule set forth by the Stephens court, there is nothing to deter fed-
eral officers from using this technology based on current precedent. As tech-
nology changes, however, so do our reasonable expectations of privacy. It is
true that the exclusionary rule exception in Davis is practically necessary
when applied to factually-specific binding precedent. After all, as the Su-
preme Court noted in Davis, the exclusionary rule can have devastating ef-
fects on society.107 Applying the Davis rule vis-A-vis the Fourth Circuit in
Stephens, however, de-claws the Fourth Amendment and leaves our right to
privacy at the mercy of advances in technology.
103. See Riley, 134 S. Ct at 2494-95.
104. Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5 (1984).
105. George M. Dery, Lying Eyes: Constitutional Implications of New Thermal
Imaging Lie Detection Technology, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 217, 218 (2004).
106. See id. at 220.
107. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011).
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